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JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction of 
recklessness, incendiary device 2nd degree felony and possession of 
a controlled substance, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. §76-10-306(3) and possession of a controlled substance, 
a third degree felony, 58-37-8 (2) (a) (1) U.C.A., in the Third 
Judicial District Court, the Honorable Judge Homer M. Wilkinson 
presiding. This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996). See Addendum A (Judgment 
and Conviction). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD FOR REVIEW 
This appeal presents the following issue for resolution by 
this Court: 
Did the trial court err in denying defendant's motion to 
suppress evidence based upon lack of probable cause where the only 
probable cause for the arrest was that defendant was asleep in a 
vehicle legally parked during daytime hours and when awakened by an 
officer knocking on his window, and when he opened his eyes, they 
were bloodshot and he acted confused. This issue was preserved 
below on the record ("R.") for appeal at R. 124-125. 
Standard of Review: "We review a trial court's 
determination of whether a particular set of facts constitutes 
4 
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probable cause non-deferentially for correctness, affording a 
measure of discretion to the trial court". State v. Spurgeon, 904 
P2d 220, 225 (Ut. Ct. App. 1995). 
Did the trial court err in denying Appellant's motion to 
suppress evidence where prior to the arrest, there was no evidence 
that any offense had been or was being committed. This issue was 
preserved below on the record at R.124-125. 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES 
The following provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules and/or 
regulations are determinative of this appeal or are of central 
importance to this appeal. 
State v. Lovearen 829 P2d 155 (Ut App 1992) 
State v. Smith, 781 P2d 879 (Ut App 1989) 
State v. Struhs, 319 UAR 37 
State v. Spurgeon, 904 P2d 220, 225 (Ut. Ct. App. 1995) 
State v. James, 361 UAR 49 (Ct. App. 1999) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS: 
The testimony of the arresting officer at the pre-
liminary hearing (R. 38-41), which was attached to appellant's 
motion showed the following facts: 
1. The officer was told by an unidentified person who 
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flagged him down, that, "there was a vehicle parked around the 
corner with out-of-state plates on it and a man sleeping in it. 
He said that they'd had problems in the area and he asked me if I 
would check the car out and the person." (R. 38). However, there 
was no evidence that any crime had been committed, or was in 
progress. 
2. The officer proceeded to the address designated 
where he found the defendant sleeping in a vehicle with Illinois 
plates, which had "a whole bunch of property in (it)." (R. 38-
39) 
3. The officer wondered if the automobile may have 
been stolen or that there had been a burglary, or that the driver 
was intoxicated (p. 39) although there were no reports of any 
such offenses, nor was there any evidence upon which to base such 
a "hunch." 
4. The officer knocked on the window to wake up the 
defendant who: 
"Acted kind of unsure of what to do at first 
and just like he was kind of stunned and 
startled and didn't know what was going on. 
And he appeared to have blood shot eyes and he was 
acting kind of weird, and so I would continue to ask 
him to roll down the window so I could talk to him. 
... so he went and reached for the keys a second time 
and I brought my hand back and told him that I was 
going to break the window if he didn't open the door. 
6 
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So at that point, he did unlock the door and I was 
able to open it." (TR. ps. 8-9 or Rec. 88 at 40-41). 
The officer had his fire arm out so the defendant could 
see it just before the defendant opened the door. 
(Rec. 88, page 24). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT: 
There was no probable cause to arrest the appellant and 
search his automobile where the appellant was asleep in a legally 
parked automobile, there was no evidence of the commission of any 
crime, and when the officer awoke him, he acted confused and had 
blood shot eyes. 
ARGUMENT 
There are three (3) levels of constitutional 
permissible contacts between police and the public. State v. 
Smith, 781 P2d 879 (Ut. App. 1989). 
xx[A]n officer may approach a citizen at anytime 
(sic) and pose questions so long as the citizen 
is not detained against his will." 
Probable cause is present when "xthe facts and 
circumstances within [the officers] knowledge and of which they 
have reasonable trustworthy information [are] sufficient in 
themselves to warrant a [person] of reasonable caution in the 
belief that "an offense has been or is being committed.'" 
(alterations in original) State v. Spuraeon, 904 P2d 220 (Ut. 
Ct. App. 1995); State v. Wright, 365 Ut. Adv. Rpts. 15 (Ut. Ct. 
7 
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App. 1999). 
Also, see State v. Struhs, 319 UAR 37, in which the 
Court of Appeals ruled that the parking of a vehicle late at 
night in an isolated area where the officer was concerned was not 
sufficient probable cause to warrant a level 3 stop as the 
officer did in the instant case. 
In the instant case, the only information that the 
officer had was that a person was asleep in the drivers seat of a 
vehicle legally parked which had personal property in it- Upon 
waking up the defendant from sleep, the officer took the position 
that the defendant's confusion and blood shot eyes gave the 
officer probable cause to believe that he was intoxicated, 
therefore giving the officer the right to restrict the 
defendant's freedom to leave, which the officer clearly did by 
drawing his gun. (R. 88, pgs. 24-25). 
The matter of nervous or confused conduct and blood 
shot eyes as probable cause was considered by this Court in State 
v. Lovegren, 829 P2d 155 (Ut. App. 1992) in which this Court 
observed: 
"It is well settled that nervous behavior 
when confronted by a police officer does not 
give rise to a reasonable suspicion of criminal 
activity. See e.g. State v. Godina-Luna, 826 P2d 
652, 654, (UT. App. 1992) ... >Msuch nervous 
conduct ... is consistent with innocent as well 
as with criminal behavior. State v. Sierra, 
754 P2d 972."' 
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In the instant case, the confusion of the defendant is 
even easier to understand. The defendant was asleep in a motor 
vehicle legally parked when awakened suddenly by an officer who 
is demanding to talk with him and then draws a gun, even though 
the vehicle is not moving, nor is there any discernable crime. 
In addition the Court in Lovegren, made the following 
comment about blood shot eyes: 
"And while blood shot eyes can indicate the 
present of drugs or alcohol, they are equally 
indicative of dust in one's eyes or lack of 
sleep," 
Certainly where a person is awakened from sleep or is 
sleeping because of lack of sleep, as the Court in Lovegren 
observed, blood shot eyes are equally indicative of lack of 
sleep. 
In the instant case, as in Lovegren, the arresting 
officer never conducted any sobriety or blood tests to confirm 
any such suspicions which indicates clearly that the actual 
context of the officer's assertion of drug or alcohol related 
driving is an after the fact claim and being asserted to support 
a such arrest by the officer. 
In the case of State v. James, 361 UAR 49, (Ct. App. 
1999), the Court ruled that the search of a truck without a 
warrant was unreasonable and suppressed the evidence gained by 
such a search. The officers had a citizen complaint by erratic 
9 
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driving and the license number of the defendant's truck. In the 
instant case, no allegation was made that an offense had been 
committed by anyone. The officer simply would not accept the 
fact that a person would not talk to him and arrested that person 
for such refusal, then searched the vehicle. 
CONCLUSION: 
The decision by the trial court denying defendants' 
motion to suppress violates the current case law by the Court of 
Appeals which show clearly that an officer does not have 
sufficient probable cause based upon blood shot eyes or confused 
and nervous behavior. This court should reverse the trial 
court's order that all of the evidence gained by the officer 
after the stop be suppressed and remand this case for a trial. 
The motion to suppress evidence should be granted. 
DATED this 7th day of September, 1999. 
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THIRD DISTRICT COURT - SLC COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs, 
WILLIAM J BROWNLEE, 
Defendant 
Custody: Prison 
MINUTES 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 971900791 FS 
Judge: HOMER WILKINSON 
Date: May 1, 1998 
PRESENT 
Clerk: jaredl 
Prosecutor: RICH HAMP 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): JOHN L. MCCOY 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: February 5, 1970 
Video 
Tape Count: 9.13 
CHARGES 
2. POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE (amended) - 3rd Degree 
Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 12/10/1997 Guilty Plea 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED 
SUBSTANCE a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an 
indeterminate term of not to exceed five years in the Utah State 
Prison. 
COMMITMENT is to begin immediately. 
To the SALT LAKE County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your 
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Case No: 971900791 
Date: May 01, 1998 
defendant will be confined. 
SENTENCE RECOMMENDATION NOTE 
THE COURT ORDERS CREDIT FOR TIME SERVED. 
DEFENDANT IS RESPONSIBLE FOR FULL RESTITUTION IN THIS MATTER. 
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JOHN L. McCOY (2164) 
RUSSELL HATHAWAY (7880) 
Attorneys for Appellant 
310 So. Main St., Suite 1314 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Tel. (801) 355-6400 
Fax. (801) 596-2336 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
WILLIAM J. BROWNLEE, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
" / ' ' ' " " • u ^ j — " -
) AMENDED ORDER 
i Case No. 971900791 
) Appeal No. 981295-CA 
) Judge Homer Wilkinson 
The Defendant's Motion for Amended Order having been entered 
and read by the Court, and good cause appearing, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, that the Minutes, 
Sentence Judgment, Commitment entered by the Court on May 1, 1998, 
be amended to reflect the following: 
1. On December 10, 1998, defendant pled guilty to the charge 
of possession of a controlled substance in this Court, 
2. Defendant's pleading was conditional, reserving the right 
to appeal the trial court's decision as to the police 
officer's probable cause for arresting the Defendant. 
3. Counsel for the State consented to the conditional plea. 
RLEDDSTROCOUp 
Third Judicial District 
FEB 1 01999 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
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A. Defendant's attorney stated, "[T]his will be a guilty 
plea, wherein, however, we preserve — the defendant does 
preserve the right to appeal the previous decision of the 
court with respect to probable cause." 
5. Counsel Howard Lemke confirmed the conditional plea, 
noting "It's our understanding the defendant will plead 
under Searv (sic) to my understanding, and we'll move to 
dismiss the remaining counts." 
6. The Minutes, Sentence, Judgment, Commitment entered by 
this Court on May 1, 1998, which constituted the Final 
Order in this matter for the purpose of filing an appeal, 
did not reflect that the defendant's guilty plea was 
conditional under the Serv doctrine. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Court 
approves the defendant's conditional plea under Searv. 
DATED THIS /& day of February, 1999. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
